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ABSTRACT
We provide an axiomatic system modeling conditional preference orders which
is based on conditional set theory. Conditional numerical representations are
introduced, and a conditional version of the theorems of Debreu on the ex-
istence of numerical representations is proved. The conditionally continuous
representations follow from a conditional version of Debreu’s Gap Lemma the
proof of which relies on a conditional version of the axiom of choice, free
of any measurable selection argument. We give a conditional version of the
von Neumann and Morgenstern representation as well as automatic conditional
continuity results, and illustrate them by examples.
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1. Introduction
In decision theory, the normative framework of preference ordering classically requires the completeness
axiom. Yet, there are good reasons to question completeness as famously pointed out by Aumann [2]:
Of all the axioms of utility theory, the completeness axiom is perhaps the most question-
able. [. . . ] For example, certain decisions that an individual is asked to make might involve
highly hypothetical situations, which he will never face in real life. He might feel that he can-
not reach an “honest” decision in such cases. Other decision problems might be extremely
complex, too complex for intuitive “insight”, and our individual might prefer to make no
decision at all in these problems. Is it “rational” to force decision in such cases?
Aumann’s remark, supported by empirical evidence, triggered intensive research in terms of interpreta-
tion, axiomatization and representation of general incomplete preferences, see [3, 15, 16, 18, 20, 34, 37]
and the references therein. These authors consider incompleteness either as a result of status quo, see
Bewley [3], or procedural decision making, see Dubra and Ok [15], and the numerical representations are
in terms of multi-utilities. However, Aumann’s quote and a correspondence with Savage [38], where he
exposes the idea of state-dependent preferences, suggest that the lack of information underlying a deci-
sion making is a natural source of incompleteness. For instance, consider the simple situation where a
person has to decide between visiting a museum or going for a walk on Sunday in one month from now.
She cannot express an unequivocal preference between these two prospective situations since it depends
on the knowledge of uncertain factors like the weather, availability of an accompanying person, etc. This
information-based incompleteness suggests a contingent form of completeness. For instance, conditioned
on the event “sunny and warm day” she prefers a walk. In this way, a complex decision problem, provided
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sufficient information, leads to an “honest” decision. The present work suggests a framework formalizing
this idea of a contingent decision making and its quantification.
Numerous quantification instruments in finance and economics entail a conditional dimension by map-
ping prospective outcomes to random variables such as for instance conditional and dynamic monetary
risk measures [1, 6, 7, 11], conditional expected utilities and certainty equivalents, dynamic assessment
indices [4, 24] or recursive utilities [17, 19]. However, few papers address the axiomatization of condi-
tional preferences underlying these conditional quantitative instruments. In this direction is the work of
Luce and Krantz [31] where an event-dependent preference ordering is considered and studied. Their ap-
proach is further refined and extended in Wakker [42] and Karni [27, 28]. State-wise dependency is used
in Kreps and Porteus [29, 30] and Maccheroni et al. [32] to study intertemporal preferences and a dy-
namic version of preferences, respectively. Remarkable is the abstract approach by Skiadas [39, 40]. He
provides a set of axioms modeling conditional preferences on random variables which admit a conditional
Savage representation of the form
U (x) = EQ [u (x) | A]
whereA is an algebra of events representing the information, Q is a subjective probability measure and u
is a utility index. As in the previous works, its decision-theoretical foundation consists of a whole family
of total pre-orders<A, one for each eventA ∈ A, and a consistent aggregation property in order to obtain
the conditional representation. However, the decision maker is assumed to implicitly take into account a
large number 1 of complete pre-orders.
Our axiomatic approach differs in so far as it considers a single but possibly incomplete preference
order < instead of a whole family of complete preference orders. Even if one cannot a priori decide
whether x < y or y < x for any two prospective outcomes, or acts, there may exist a contingent infor-
mation A conditioned on which x is preferable to y. In this case we formally write x|A < y|A. The set
of contingent information is modeled as an algebra of events A = (A,∩,∪, c, ∅,Ω) of a state space Ω.2
In order to describe the conditional nature of the preference, we require that < interacts consistently with
the information, that is,
• consistency: if x|A < y|A and B ⊆ A, then x|B < y|B;
• stability: if x|A < y|A and x|B < y|B, then x|A ∪B < y|A ∪B;
• local completeness: for every two acts x and y there exists a non-empty event A such that either
x|A < y|A or x|A < y|A.
These assumptions bear a certain normative appeal in view of the conditional approach that we are aiming
at. In the context of the previous example, consistency says that if the person prefers a walk over a visit to
a museum whenever it is “sunny” or “warm”, then a fortiori she prefers a walk if it is “sunny”. Stability
tells that if she prefers a walk whenever it is “sunny” or “rainy”, then on any day where at least one of
these conditions is met she will go for a walk. In contrast to classical preferences, we only assume a local
completeness: For any two situations she is able to meet a decision provided enough – possibly extremely
precise3 – information. In our example, there exists a rather unlikely, but still non-trivial, coincidence of
the conditions ‘sunny’, ‘humidity between 15 and 20%’ and ‘wind between 0 and 10km/h’ under which
she prefers a walk to the museum. Unlike classical completeness, the information necessary to decide
1In a five steps binary tree, 4.294.967.296 is the cardinality of the family of total pre-orders <A.
2Conditional set theory [14] allows the contingent information to be any complete Boolean algebra.
3Indeed, the smaller the event, the more precise in which state of the world this event may occur. The most precise event being
the singleton.
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between two acts x and y depends on the pair (x, y). Note that if the set of contingent information reduces
to the trivial information A = {∅,Ω}, then, as expected, a conditional preference is a classical complete
preference order. In particular, classical decision theory is a special case of the conditional one.
Observe that our approach, as [29, 31, 39, 40, 42], considers an exogenously given set of informations
or events as the source of incomplete decision making. Whereas in [3, 15] and the related subsequent
literature on incomplete preference, the incompleteness and the resulting multi-valued representations
yield an endogenous information about the nature of the incompleteness. Incompleteness there is however
not in terms of an algebra of events, and therefore not specifically related to a contingent decision making.
Our approach is also not a priori dynamic in the sense that a single algebra of available information
is given for the contingent decision making. We do not address the question of progressive learning
over time as new information reveals, resulting in an update of decisions. This incremental learning
approach in decision making is investigated by Kreps and Porteus [29], and recently by Dillenberger
et al. [12] as well as Piermont et al. [35].4 In these articles, the agent learns over time and may modify
her behavior according to the new information as well as her previous choice making. However, the
underlying information structure is exogenously given – either by a fixed dynamic structure by means
of a filtration or a random tree, or by the filtration generated by the consumption paths, or even by
the filtration generated by the previous preference orders. Our approach may help in these cases by
considering a sequence of conditional preference orders<0,<1, . . . ,<t, . . . with respect to an increasing
sequence of algebra of events A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ At ⊆ · · · each of which for every point in time. We
can provide an axiomatic system to describe these conditional preference orders <t for each given time
t, and derive a sequence of conditional numerical representations Ut. Since we only address the case of
a single information structure, that is, at a fixed given time t, we intentionally left out the following two
questions in the dynamic context. First, whether the decision making at time t is influenced by the past
information, that is a Markovian versus non-Markovian decision making. Second, the impact at time t
of past and eventually future decisions. In other terms, the interdependence structure over time of these
preferences and the consequences for the dynamic utility representation5 in terms of time consistency.6
Although being intuitive, it is mathematically not obvious what is meant by a contingent prospective
act x|A. The formalization of which corresponds to the notion of a conditional set, introduced recently by
Drapeau et al. [14]. An heuristic introduction to conditional sets is given in Section 2. For an exhaustive
mathematical presentation we refer to [14]. The formalization and properties of conditional preferences
are given in Section 3. In Section 4, we address the notion of conditional numerical representation and
prove a conditional version of Debreu’s existence result of continuous numerical representations. While
the proof technique differs, the classical statements in decision theory translate into the conditional frame-
work. For instance, a conditional version of the classical representation of von Neumann and Morgenstern
[41] is presented in Section 5. The representation of Debreu requires topological assumptions that often
are not met in practice. In Section 6, we provide conditional results that allow to extend Debreu and
Rader’s theorem in a more general framework, and present automatic continuity results which allow to
bypass topological assumptions. We illustrate each of these cases by examples. These results in their
classical form rely on the Gap Lemma of Debreu [9, 10] the conditional adaptation of which does not in-
volve any measurable selection arguments but derives from a conditional version of the axiom of choice.
Section 7 is dedicated to the formulation and the proof of this conditional Gap Lemma. In Appendix A,
we gather some technical results and most of the proofs.
4Though, Dillenberger et al. [12] consider a static approach resulting in dynamic utility valuations that are deterministic.
5For instance, time consistency, Bellman principle, weaker time consistency, etc.
6A topic of intensive study in mathematical finance, see [1, 4, 6–8] among others.
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2. Conditional Sets
As mentioned in the introduction, we model the contingent information, conditioned on which a decision
maker ranks prospective outcomes, by an algebra of events A. For technical reasons, we assume that it is
a σ-algebra with a probability measure defined on it. The inclusion of two events is then to be understood
in the almost sure sense.7 A set X – that in the present context describes acts – is a conditional set of A
if it allows for conditioning actions A : X → X|A for each event A ∈ A which satisfy a consistency and
an aggregation property:
Consistency: For any two acts x, y ∈ X and eventsA ⊆ B, if the acts x and y coincide conditioned
on B, that is, x|B = y|B, then they also coincide conditioned on A, that is, x|A = y|A.
Stability: For any two acts x, y ∈ X and event A ∈ A, there exists an act z ∈ X such that z
coincides with x conditioned onA and with y otherwise. We denote this element z = x|A+y|Ac.8
Intuitively, the action x 7→ x|A tells how acts are conditioned on the information A and X|A represents
the acts in x conditioned to A.
Example 2.1. Following the example from the introduction, there are two unconditional alternatives
x = ‘going for a walk’ and y = ‘going to the museum’,
and the information is reduced to a single condition A =‘sunny’ which yields the algebra
A = {0, A,Ac,Ω} = {‘no information’, ‘sunny’, ‘not sunny’, ‘full information’}.
The corresponding conditional set of acts is then given by
X = {x, y, x|A+ y|Ac, y|A+ x|Ac} .
For instance, the act x|A+ y|Ac stays for going for a walk provided it is sunny and going to the museum
otherwise. ♦
Example 2.2. The conditional rational numbers are defined as follows: given two rational numbers
q1, q2 ∈ Q and an event A ∈ A, let q := q1|A + q2|Ac be the conditional rational number which is
q1 conditioned on A and q2 otherwise.9 The set of conditional rational numbers, denoted by Q, is a
conditional set where the conditioning action is given by q|B = q1|A∩B+ q2|Ac ∩B ∈ Q|B. The con-
ditional natural numbersN are defined analogously. In analogy to the next example,N andQ correspond
to the set of random variables with rational values and natural values, respectively. ♦
7In the theory of conditional sets, any complete algebra can be considered as a source of information and what follows also holds
in this slightly more general framework. Though, from an economical point of view, most standard frameworks consider finite
algebras of events or σ-algebras with a probability measure on it that describe the events of null measure, that is, those events
that are considered as never occurring. A σ-algebra on which sets are identified if they coincide almost surely is complete, see
[14, 25]. If one does not want to consider probability spaces, the Borel sets of a Polish space factorised by the sets of category
one is a complete Boolean algebra.
8Since we assume thatA can be made complete, the concatenation property is required for any partition of events (Ai) ⊆ A and
family of acts (xi) ⊆ X , and we denote x =
∑
xi|Ai the unique element such that x coincides with xi conditioned on Ai.
9More generally, given a partition of events (An) ⊆ A and a corresponding family of rationals (qn) ⊆ Q, define the conditional
rational number q :=
∑
qn|An as the conditional element which has the value qn conditioned on An.
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Example 2.3. Another example is the collection
L0(A) = {x : Ω→ R such that x is A-measurable}
of random variables. Given a random variable x and an event A, the conditioning of x on A is the
restriction x|A : A → R, ω 7→ x|A(ω) := x(ω) for ω ∈ A. For any two random variables x, y and an
event A, then z = x|A+ y|Ac corresponds to the random variable x1A + y1Ac where 1A is the indicator
function of the event A.
In many cases, the information algebra A describes the exogenous information which is however only
partially available to the agent for a decision making. For instance, the information available tomorrow
to decide about random outcomes that are due in a year from now and depend on the whole information
during that year. This can be modelled as follows. Given another algebra B with a probability measure
on it and such that A ⊆ B, we can define
L1(B) := {x : Ω→ R such that x is B-measurable with E [|x| | A] <∞} .
as the set ofB-measurable random variables with finite conditional expectation with respect to tomorrow’s
informationA.10 Inspection shows that it defines a conditional set ofA when considering the restrictions
x|A for events A which are in the smaller algebra A. ♦
Example 2.4. As it concerns decision theory, lotteries – or probability distributions – are often used as
objects for decision making. We define
P (A) := {µ : Ω→ P such that µ is A-measurable}
where P is a set of lotteries. A conditional lottery can be seen as a state-dependent lottery providing for
each state ω a lottery µ(ω, dx). Throughout, we denote by P (A) the set of state-dependent measurable
lotteries. Likewise random variables, it defines a conditional set where µ|A is the conditional lottery
restricted to the event A and for every two conditional lotteries µ, ν and event A, the conditional lottery
η = µ|A+ ν|Ac corresponds to the conditional lottery µ1A + ν1Ac .
Another typical object are Anscombe-Aumann acts which are extensions of lotteries. Actually the
conditional set of conditional lotteries P (A) already represents, strictly speaking, Anscombe-Aumann
acts. However, in our context, the decision making is contingent and therefore realised with respect to
the available information A. In the present form, an Anscombe-Aumann act is a state-dependent lottery
but measurable with respect to a larger algebra of events B on which the decision maker cannot make an
honest decision. Just as L1(B), the conditional set of conditional Anscombe-Aumann acts is defined as
P (B) := {µ : Ω→ P such that µ is B-measurable} . ♦
The relation between conditional sets is described by the conditional inclusion which is characterized
by two dimensions, a classical inclusion and a conditioning:
• On the one hand, every non-empty set Y ⊆ X which is stable, that is, x|A + y|Ac ∈ Y for every
x, y ∈ Y and A ∈ A, is a conditional subset of X .
• On the other hand, X|A is a conditional set but on the relative algebra AA := {B ∩ A : B ∈ A}
and a subset of X conditioned on A.
10It is in fact an L0-module as studied and introduced in [21, 22]
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Combining the two dimensions, a conditional set Y is said to be conditionally included in X , denoted
Y v X , if Y = Z|A for some stable Z ⊆ X and a condition A ∈ A. In that case, we say that Y is
a conditional set “living” on A and if we want to emphasize the condition on which this conditional set
lives, we denote it Y |A. The conditional inclusion is illustrated in Figure 1a. If A = ∅, then X|∅ lives
nowhere and in particular is conditionally contained in any conditional set, and thus is conditionally the
emptyset. The conditional powerset
P(X) := {Y : Y v X} = {Y : Y = Z|A for some event A ∈ A and a stable set Z ⊆ X}
consists of the collection of all conditional subsets of X .
Example 2.5. In Example 2.1, the set {x, y} ⊆ X is not stable since x|A+y|Ac 6∈ {x, y}. Hence {x, y}
is not a conditional set whereas Z := {x; y|A+ x|Ac} is stable, and therefore a conditional subset of X
living on Ω. However, Y := {x|A, y|A} is a conditional subset of X living on A. Indeed, Y |A = Z|A.♦
The conditional intersection of two conditional sets Y,Z is the intersection on the largest conditionA∗ on
which Y and Z have a non-empty classical intersection as illustrated in Figure 1b. The conditional union
(a) Illustration of the conditional inclusion. (b) Illustration of the conditional intersection.
of two conditional subsets Y,Z is the collection of all elements which can be concatenated such that each
piece of the concatenation conditionally falls either in Y or in Z. The conditional union is defined by
Y unionsq Z := {y|A+ z|B : y|A ∈ Y |A, z|B ∈ Z|B and A ∩B = ∅}
and illustrated in Figure 1c. Finally, the conditional complement Y @ of a conditional subset Y is the
collection of all those elements y which nowhere fall into Y , as illustrated in Figure 1d.
A main result in [14] is that the conditional powerset together with these operations forms a complete
Boolean algebra (P(X),unionsq,u,@, X|∅, X) .
Following the classical constructions, the conditional powerset allows to define conditional relations, and
functions, and topologies, and other conditional structures, see [14].
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(c) Illustration of the conditional union. (d) Illustration of the conditional complement.
3. Conditional Preference Orders
For the remainder of the paper X denotes a conditional set. A conditional binary relation < is a condi-
tional subset G v X × X living on Ω and we write x < y if and only if (x, y) ∈ G. In particular, a
conditional binary relation is at first a classical binary relation. However, due to the fact that the graph
G is a conditional set and writing x|A < y|A for (x|A, y|A) ∈ G|A, the following additional properties
hold
• consistency: if x|A < y|A and B ⊆ A, then x|B < y|B;
• stability: if x|A < y|A and x|B < y|B, then x|A ∪B < y|A ∪B;
corresponding to two of the normative properties mentioned in the introduction. Given a conditional
binary relation, ∼ denotes the symmetric part of the binary relation and we use the notation
x  y if and only if x < y and y|A 6< x|A for every non-empty event A ∈ A.
In other words, x  y means that x is strictly preferred to y on any non-empty condition. Both ∼ and 
are conditional binary relations.
Definition 3.1. A conditional binary relation < on X is called a conditional preference order if < is
• reflexive: x < x for every x;
• transitive: From x < y and y < z it follows that x < z;
• locally complete: for every x 6∼ y there exists a non-empty event A such that either x|A  y|A or
y|A  x|A.
Although a conditional preference is not total, the following lemma shows that local completeness allows
to derive for every two elements a partition on which a comparison can be achieved.
Lemma 3.2. Let < be a conditional preference order on X and x, y ∈ X . There is a pairewise disjoint
family of conditions A,B,C such that A ∪B ∪ C = Ω and
x|A ∼ y|A, x|B  y|B and y|C  x|C.
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Proof. Let x, y ∈ X and define11
A = ∪{A˜ ∈ A : x|A˜ ∼ y|A˜}, B = ∪{B˜ ∈ A : x|b˜  y|B˜} and C = ∪{C˜ ∈ A : C˜y  C˜x}
which are the largest conditions on which x is conditionally equivalent, strictly better or worse than y,
respectively. Due to the consistency property of conditional relations, it follows that these conditions are
mutually disjoint. For the sake of contradiction, suppose thatD := A∪B∪C 6= Ω. It follows that outside
D, that is, conditioned on Dc, the element x is nowhere either equivalent, strictly better or worse than y.
Otherwise, this contradicts the definition of A, B and C. Define y˜ = x|D + y|Dc being x conditioned
on D and y conditioned on Dc. Since x 6∼ y and ∼ is a conditional equivalence relation, it follows that
x 6∼ y˜, otherwise x|Dc ∼ y|Dc contradicting the definition of A. By local completeness, there exists a
non-empty condition E such that either x|E  y˜|E or y˜|E  x|E. Without loss of generality, suppose
that x|E  y˜|E. Since y˜|D = x|D ∼ x|D by reflexivity and consistency, it follows that E is disjoint
from D, in other words E ⊆ Dc. In particular, y˜|E = y|E implying that x|E  y|E, which together
with ∅ 6= E ⊆ Dc contradict the maximality of B. Thus D = Ω which ends the proof. 
Example 3.3. Let us give a complete formal description of the example in the introduction. Recall
from Example 2.1 thatA = {‘no information’, ‘sunny’, ‘not sunny’, ‘full information’} = {∅, A,Ac,Ω},
and that the conditional set generated from the two unconditional choices x =‘going for a walk’ and
y =‘going to the museum’ is given byX = {x, y, x|A+ y|Ac, y|A+ x|Ac}. The conditional preference
being reflexive, it trivially holds
x < x, y < y, x|A+ y|Ac < x|A+ y|Ac, y|A+ x|Ac < y|A+ x|Ac.
Further, the individual prefers going for a walk if it is sunny and to the museum otherwise. This translates
into
x|A  y|A and y|Ac  x|Ac.
Since the preference is assumed to be conditional, it also holds
x|A+ y|Ac < y|A+ x|Ac, x < y|A+ x|Ac, x|A+ y|Ac < y.
For instance, the relation x < y|A+x|Ac states that going for a walk is in any case better than going to the
museum if it is sunny and going for a walk otherwise. Inspection shows that the conditional preference
is indeed a transitive and reflexive conditional relation. As mentioned, this relation does not tell whether
x is preferred to y, that is, whether she wants to go for a walk or to the museum. There exists however
a condition A =‘sunny’, such that x|A < y|A which shows that it is locally complete. In particular, the
partitioning given in Lemma 3.2 corresponds to
x|∅ ∼ y|∅, x|A  y|A, y|Ac  x|Ac.
Note also that conditional sets allow to solve the following puzzle: Define Y = {z  y}, the set of
elements which are strictly preferred to y. In a classical setting this set is empty. Indeed, there exists
no alternative which is strictly preferred to going to the museum since conditioned on Ac, y is maximal
for the preference order. However, as our intuition suggests, this set should not be empty and indeed it
is conditionally non-empty since Y = {x|A}. The importance of this fact is observed in the proof of
Debreu’s Theorem 4.6 with the definitions of Z± towards the construction of a conditional numerical
representation. ♦
11Recall that we assume thatA is an algebra that can be factorized in such a way that it is complete with respect to the formations
of unions and intersections.
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Example 3.4. In the framework of Example 2.3 of A-measurable random variables, the natural partial
order on L0(A) given by x > y if and only if x(ω) ≥ y(ω) for almost all ω is an example of a conditional
preference order. Indeed, it is consistent since if the random variable x is greater than the random variable
y on an event A, then it is also the case on any event B ⊆ A. Likewise it is stable, reflexive and
transitive, even asymmetric and therefore a conditional partial order. However, it is also locally complete.
Indeed, if x 6= y, then it follows immediately that either the event B := {ω : x(ω) > y(ω)} or the
event C := {ω : x(ω) < y(ω)} is non-empty. Actually, defining the events A = {ω : x(ω) = y(ω)},
B = {ω : x(ω) > y(ω)} and C := {ω : x(ω) < y(ω)} provide the partition of Lemma 3.2.
Since the conditional rational numbers Q coincide with a subset of A-measurable random variables,
the same conditional total ordering in the almost sure sense can be defined on them. ♦
Remark 3.5. In general, a conditional preference can be an equivalence relation conditioned on A and
strictly non-trivial on Ac. However, the case of interest lives on Ac. Therefore, throughout this paper, we
assume that a conditional preference is conditionally non-trivial, that is, there exists a pair x, y ∈ X such
that x  y 
4. Conditional Numerical Representations
Next we address the quantification of such a conditional ranking. First, we need the notion of a conditional
function. A conditional function f : X → Y between two conditional sets is a classical function with the
additional property of stability:
f (x|A+ y|Ac) = f(x)|A+ f(y)|Ac.
Example 4.1. The A-conditional expectation of elements of L1(B) introduced in Example 2.3, is a con-
ditional function. Indeed, for every x, y ∈ L1(B) and each A ∈ A it holds
f (x|A+ y|A) := E [1Ax+ 1Acy | A] = 1AE [x | A] + 1AcE [y | A] = f(x)|A+ f(y)|Ac
since 1A is A-measurable. ♦
Example 4.2. For q = q1|A + q2|Ac and r = r1|B + r2|Bc, define the conditional addition and condi-
tional absolute value onQ as
q + r :=

q1 + r1 on A ∩B
q1 + r2 on A ∩Bc
q2 + r1 on Ac ∩B
q2 + r2 on Ac ∩Bc
and |q| := |q1| |A+ |q2| |Ac.
Together with an analogous definition for conditional multiplication these operations make Q a condi-
tional totally ordered field as defined in [14].
In particular, this allows to define on Q the conditional variant of the Euclidean topology on Q by the
conditional balls
Br(q) := {p ∈ Q : |q − p| 6 r} ,
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for q ∈ Q and r ∈ Q++ := {p ∈ Q : p > 0}. It behaves like the standard topology on Q with the
additional local property:
Br1(q)|A+Br2(p)|Ac := Br1|A+r2|Ac(q|A+ p|A), ♦
for every r1, r2 ∈ Q++ and q, p ∈ Q++. In other words, a conditional neighborhood of 3 conditioned
on A and 2/5 on Ac is itself a conditional neighborhood of the conditional rational 3|A+ 2/5|Ac.
For the quantification, we secondly need a conditional analogue of the real line which allows to rep-
resent the conditional preferences. The conditional real numbers, denoted by R, are obtained from the
conditional rational numbers by adapting Cantor’s construction, that is, identifying conditional Cauchy
sequences in Q. As in the standard theory, the conditional real numbers can be characterized as a con-
ditional field where every bounded subset has an infimum and a supremum and which is topologically
conditionally separable. In particular,Q is conditionally dense inR.
Remark 4.3. In our context of an algebra of events, the conditional real lineR corresponds exactly to the
conditional set of random variables L0(A) endowed with the L0-topology introduced in [21], as shown in
[14]. Therefore, in the following, the reader may always think of the conditional real line as being the set
of A-measurable random variables. In particular, conditional numerical representations map conditional
preferences to the almost sure order between A-measurable random variables. 
Definition 4.4. A conditional numerical representation of a conditional preference order < on X is a
conditional function U : X → R such that
x < y if and only if U(x) > U(y). (4.1)
Note that every conditional function U : X → R defines a conditional preference order by means of
(4.1). Furthermore, if U : X → R is a conditional numerical representation, then ϕ ◦ U is a conditional
numerical representation for every conditionally strictly increasing function ϕ : R→ R.
Remark 4.5. The conditional entropic monetary utility function studied for instance in [24] as a special
case of a conditional certainty equivalent and given by
U(x) = ln
(
E
[
ex
∣∣A]) , x ∈ L1 (B) ,
is a representation of a conditional preference. Indeed, this function is local since for every A ∈ A it
holds
U(x|A+ y|Ac) = ln (E [e1Ax+1Acy ∣∣A]) = ln (1AE [ex ∣∣A]+ 1AcE [ey ∣∣A])
= 1A ln
(
E
[
ex
∣∣A])+ 1Ac ln (E [ey ∣∣A]) = U(x)|A+ U(y)|Ac.
The same argumentation holds for all conditional certainty equivalents, conditional/dynamic risk mea-
sures or acceptability indices mentioned in the introduction. 
Given a conditional preference order, we address the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a
conditional numerical representation exists. The first result is a conditional version of Debreu’s statement
in [9] and necessitates the notion of conditionally order dense. A conditional subset Z v X is condition-
ally order dense if for every x, y ∈ X with x  y, there exists z ∈ Z such that x < z < y. The case
of interest is when Z is conditionally countable, that is, there exists a conditional injection ϕ : Z → Q.
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Equivalently, Z is conditionally countable if it is a conditional sequence Z = (zn)n∈N where N is the
conditional natural numbers. There exists a difference between a conditional sequence and a standard
sequence: Analogous to the classical case, a conditional sequence (zn) in Z is a conditional function
f : N → Z, n 7→ f(n) = zn. However stability yields zn|A + zm|Ac = f(n)|A + f(m)|Ac =
f(n|A + m|Ac) = zn|A+m|Ac . In other words, the sequence step n conditioned on A and the sequence
step m conditioned on Ac result into the sequence step n|A+m|Ac.
Theorem 4.6. A conditional preference order < on X admits a conditional numerical representation if
and only if X has a conditionally countable order dense subset.
Proof. The if-part: Without loss of generality, assume Z = {zn : n ∈ N} is a conditionally countable
order dense subset of X which is not conditionally finite. Consider now
Z+(x) := {z ∈ Z : z  x} and Z−(x) := {z ∈ Z : x  z} .
Since< is a conditional binary relation, Z+(x) and Z−(x) are conditional subsets of Z for every x ∈ X .
However, as mentioned in Example 3.3, Z±(x) may both live on some event smaller than Ω.12 Further,
(Z±(x))x∈X is a conditional family in the conditional powerset P(Z), that is, Z±(x) = Z±(x1)|A +
Z±(x2)|Ac for every x = x1|A+ x2|Ac ∈ X . Due to transitivity,
x < y implies Z+(x) v Z+(y) and Z−(y) v Z−(x). (4.2)
It follows from conditional order denseness that x  y implies that there is z ∈ Z such that x  z < y
on some event A and x < z  y on Ac. Thus
z|A ∈ [Z−(x) \ Z−(y)] |A and z|Ac ∈ [Z+(y) \ Z+(x)] |Ac for some z ∈ Z and A ∈ A. (4.3)
Let now µ be a strictly positive conditional measure on Z13, that is, µ({zn}) > 0 for every n ∈ N.
Define then U(x) = µ(Z−(x)) − µ(Z+(x)) for every x ∈ X . Then U is a conditional function since
(Z±(x))x∈X is a conditional family and µ is a conditional function. On the one hand, from (4.2) and µ
being conditionally increasing it follows that x < y implies U(x) > U(y). On the other hand, assume
that x  y on some non-empty event A. Without loss of generality, A = Ω. Then from (4.3) and µ being
strictly positive it follows that x  y yields
U(x) = µ(Z−(x))− µ(Z+(x))
>
[
µ({z}) + µ(Z−(y))] |A− [µ(Z+(y))− µ({z})] |Ac
= µ({z}) + U(y) > U(y).
From the conditional completeness of < it follows that U is a conditional numerical representation.
The only if-part: A conditional preference order which admits a conditional numerical representation
is conditionally complete since the conditional reals are so. It holds that Y := Im(U) is a conditional sub-
set ofR. Choose a conditionally countable order dense subset I v Y by Lemma 7.1. Then Z := U−1(I)
is conditionally countable and since U is a conditional numerical representation, it is conditionally order
dense. 
12Let A be the event on which Z+(x) lives. It means that there exists no z ∈ Z such that z is strictly preferred to x conditioned
on Ac. Since Z is conditionally order dense, it follows that x is a maximal element conditioned on Ac.
13For instance, define µ({zn}) = 2−n :=
∑
2−nk |Ak for every n =
∑
nk|Ak ∈ N.
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The existence of a conditionally countable order dense subset is rather of technical nature. In the classical
case, Debreu [9, 10] and then Rader [36] showed that under some topological assumptions a numerical
representation exists. And even more, by means of Debreu’s Gap Lemma, the existence of an upper semi-
continuous or continuous representation is guaranteed. The conditional counterparts of these results also
hold, based on a conditional adaptation of Debreu’s Gap Lemma in Section 7.
Definition 4.7. Let < be a conditional preference order on a conditional topological space X .14 We say
that < is conditionally upper semi-continuous if U(x) := {y ∈ X : y < x} is conditionally closed for
every x ∈ X . A conditional numerical representation U : X → R is said to be conditionally upper
semi-continuous if {x ∈ X : U(x) > m} is conditionally closed for every m ∈ R.
Theorem 4.8. Let < be a conditionally upper semi-continuous preference order on a conditionally sec-
ond countable15 topological space X . Then < admits a conditionally upper semi-continuous numerical
representation. In particular, if< is conditionally continuous16, then it admits a conditionally continuous
numerical representation.
Example 4.9. The conditional set L1(B) of Example 2.3 is a typical framework in which Rader’s The-
orem applies. Indeed, as soon as B is regular enough17, then it follows that L1(B) is a conditionally
second countable Banach space for the conditional norm ‖x‖ = E[|x| |A]. Therefore, any conditionally
upper semi-continuous conditional preference order< on the set of random outcomes in a year from now
conditioned on the information tomorrow admits a numerical representation U such that
x < y if and only if U(x) > U(y) almost surely. ♦
5. A Conditional von Neumann-Morgenstern Representation
A classical class of preferences are the affine ones and the resulting affine numerical representation due
to von Neumann and Morgenstern [41]. This representation can be carried over to the conditional case
as follows. Let X be a conditionally convex subset living on 1 of some conditional vector space. We say
that a conditional preference order on X satisfies the
• conditional independence axiom: if x  y then αx+ (1−α)z  αy+ (1−α)z for every z ∈ X
and each α ∈]0, 1];
• conditional Archimedean axiom: if x  y  z then αx + (1 − α)z  y  βx + (1 − β)z for
some α, β ∈]0, 1[.
A conditional real-valued numerical representation U of < is conditionally affine, if
U(αx+ (1− α)y) = αU(x) + (1− α)U(y),
for every x, y ∈ X and each α ∈ [0, 1].
14A conditional topology is the counterpart to a classical topology but with respect to the conditional operations of union and
intersection, see [14].
15The conditional topology of which is generated by a conditionally countable neighborhood base.
16That is, U(x) = {y ∈ X : y < x} and U(y) = {y ∈ X : x < y} are conditionally closed for every x ∈ X .
17That is, a separable σ-algebra.
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Theorem 5.1. Let < be a conditional preference order satisfying both the conditional Archimedean and
independence axioms. Then < admits a conditionally affine representation U . Moreover, if Uˆ is another
conditionally affine representation, then Uˆ = αU + β, where α > 0 and β ∈ R.
The result of Neumann and Morgenstern goes a step forward by providing a utility index against which
lotteries are ranked according to expectation. In our context, following Example 2.4, conditional lotteries
on the real line is the conditional set
P (A) := {µ : Ω→ P such that µ is measurable}
where P denotes a set of deterministic lotteries on the real line.18 We endow this conditional set with the
conditional weak∗ topology generated by the conditional set of bounded functions
Cb(A) := {f : Ω→ Cb such that f is measurable}
where Cb is the set of continuous functions from the real line into the real line. In other words, a function
u ∈ Cb(A) is a state-dependent continuous function u(ω, x), that is, a state-dependent utility index. The
conditional scalar product is given by the random variable
ω 7−→ 〈f, µ〉(ω) =
∫
R
f(ω, x)µ(ω, dx), for almost all ω ∈ Ω
which is an element of R = L0(A). In this framework, the classical representation theorem of von
Neumann and Morgenstern carries over as follows.
Theorem 5.2. Let < be a conditional preference order on the conditional convex set of lotteries P (A).
Suppose that< fulfills the conditional independence and Archimedean axioms and< is weak∗-continuous.
Then there exists a unique, up to strictly positive conditionally affine transformation, conditional utility
function u ∈ C(A) such that
µ < ν if and only if
∫
u(ω, x)µ(ω, dx) ≥
∫
u(ω, x)ν(ω, dx) for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. This is a consequence of Theorem 5.1 together with a conditional version of the Riez theorem, see
[26]. 
6. Further Conditional Representations
As in the classical case, the assumptions of Theorem 4.8 are empirically as well as mathematically prob-
lematic for the following reasons
• Many of the topologies of interest for practical representations are not second countable, not even
metrizable;
• Requiring upper semi-continuity is an empirical issue in particular for non-metrizable topologies
since it is not practically falsifiable.
18These are related to conditional distribution on the conditional real line R, see Jamneshan et al. [26] for the construction and
definition of such conditional probability distributions.
13
An answer to the first point is the following proposition that relies on a conditional version of Banach-
Alaoglu based on the notion of conditional compactness introduced in [14].
Proposition 6.1. Let Y be a conditionally separable locally convex topological vector space admitting a
conditionally countable neighborhood base of 0, and denote by X its topological dual endowed with the
conditional weak∗ topology σ(X,Y ). Then every conditionally upper semi-continuous preference order
< on X admits an upper semi-continuous numerical representation.
Example 6.2. Suppose that we are interested into the decision making of an agent according to tomor-
row’s information A between random outcomes in a year from now, that is measurable with respect to
some wider information algebra B ⊇ A. Suppose further that these random outcomes are bounded, that
is, belong to the following conditional set
L∞(B) := {x : Ω→ R such that x is measurable and bounded by an A-measurable random variable} .
From [22] it is known that it is the conditional dual of L1(B) introduced in Example 2.3 which is con-
ditionally separable provided that B is regular enough. It follows that if < is σ(L∞(B), L1(B))-upper
semi-continuous, then it admits a numerical representation U . If furthermore, < is
• conditionally convex: x < y implies αx + (1 − α)y < y for every conditional real number
0 6 α 6 1 which describes a form of preference of diversification;
• monotone: x < y whenever x 6 y, which describes a preference for almost sure better outcomes;
then, it follows that U is conditionally quasiconvex and monotone and by means of [5, 13], and the
conditional extension in [4, Theorem 2.12 and Remark 2.13], it admits the following robust representation
U(x) = inf
Q∈∆
R (Q,EQ[x|A])
for a unique19 conditional risk function R : ∆ × R → [−∞,∞] where ∆ is the set of probability
measures absolutely continuous with respect to the reference measure. ♦
As for the second question, we show that automatic continuity results taking advantage of monotonicity
also extends to the continuous case and yields the following result.
Proposition 6.3. Let < be a conditionally complete preference order on a conditional Banach space20
X . Suppose that < is conditionally convex and monotone and satisfies the
Upper Archimedean Axiom: If x < y  z, then there exists α ∈ R with 0 < α < 1 such that
y  αx+ (1− α)z.
Then < is conditionally upper semi-continuous.
Let us illustrate this automatic continuity result in the framework presented in [4]. By xt, xt+1, . . . , xT
we denote a future cumulative cash-flow stream starting from a given future time t. We are interested
in the study of an investor’s assessment < of these future cash-flows but conditioned on the available
information at this time A := At. The information at time s is denoted by As and it holds As ⊆ As+1
19The characterization of which can be found in [4, Theorem 2.12 and Remark 2.13].
20It also holds on a Fréchet lattice.
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for every s ≥ t. The cash-flow xs is adapted to As and is square integrable, that is E[|xs|2 |At] < ∞.
We denote by
L2(As, s ≥ t) :=
{
x = (xt, . . . , xT ) : xs ∈ L2(As), s = t, . . . , T
}
which is a conditionally reflexive Hilbert space, see [14, 22]. We denote by
• ∆ the set of probability measures Q absolutely continuous with respect to the reference measure;
• D the set of discounting factors, that is those processes D = (Dt, . . . , DT ) where 1 = Dt >
Dt+1 > . . . > DT > 0 where Ds is As−1 adapted.
It follows that
EQ
[
T∑
k=t
Dk(xk − xk−1)
∣∣At]
is the expected discounted value of the cash-flow stream xk − xk−1 for the discount factor D ∈ D under
the probability model Q ∈ ∆. For reasons discussed in [4], we denote by Q ⊗ D ∈ ∆ ⊗ D the set of
those Q,D with some L2-integrability conditions.
Proposition 6.4. Let < be a conditional preference order on L(As, s ≥ t). Suppose that it is
• convex: x < y implies αx+ (1− α)y < y for every conditional real number 0 6 α 6 1;
• monotone: x < y whenever xs > ys for every s ≥ t;
• upper Archimedean: if x < y  z, then there exists some conditional real number 0 < α < 1 such
that y  αx+ (1− α)z.
Then,< is upper semi-continuous and admits an upper-semi continuous numerical representation U with
robust representation
U(x) = inf
Q⊗D∈∆⊗D
R
(
Q⊗D;EQ
[
T∑
k=t
Dk(xk − xk−1)
∣∣At]) (6.1)
for a unique minimal risk function R : ∆⊗D ×R→ [−∞,∞].
This representation shows that convex and monotone conditional assessment of future cash flows excerpts
a prudent assessment of probability as well as discounting model uncertainty. If we can ensure the ex-
istence of an upper semi-continuous, quasiconvex, conditional and monotone numerical representation
U , then existence and uniqueness of Representation 6.1 is a consequence of [4, Theorem 3.4]. How-
ever, L2(As, s ≥ t) being a Banach space, it follows that the assumption of the propositions fulfills the
assumptions of Proposition 6.3 and so we obtain the existence of an upper semi-continuous numerical
representation.
7. Conditional Gap Lemma
For s, t ∈ R with s 6 t we denote [s, t] = {u ∈ R : s 6 u 6 t} and if s < t we denote [s, t[= {u ∈
R : s 6 u < t}, ]s, t] = {u ∈ R : s < u 6 t}, and ]s, t[= {u ∈ R : s < u < t}, all conditionally
convex subsets of R which live on Ω. In the conditional topology of R the conditionally convex subset
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[s, t] is conditionally closed whereas ]s, t[ is conditionally open. A conditionally convex subset I v R
is an interval. Denoting by s = inf I and t = sup I , an interval is generically denoted by (s, t).21 Up
to conditioning, all conditionally convex subsets of R are characterized as conditional intervals. If we
assume that an interval lives on Ω, convexity yields
(s, t) = [s, t]|A+ [s, t[|B+]s, t]|C+]s, t[|D (7.1)
where A = E ∩ F , B = E ∩ F c, C = Ec ∩ F , D = Ec ∪ F c and E = ∪{E˜ : s|E˜ ∈ I|E˜} and
F = ∪{F˜ : t|F˜ ∈ I|F˜}, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Illustration of a Gap.
Let S v R and (s, t) be an interval22 such that (s, t) v S@. Inspection shows that there exists a unique
maximal interval (s∗, t∗) with respect to conditional inclusion such that (s, t) v (s∗, t∗) v S@. Such a
maximal interval with inf S@ < s∗ 6 t∗ < supS@ on the conditions where s∗, t∗ are living is called a
conditional gap of S. Note that any conditional gap (s, t) of S can be decomposed into
(s, t) = {s}|A+ (s, t)|B
where A ∩ B = ∅ and s < t on B, that is the conditional interior of (s, t) lives on B. Moreover, the
family of conditional gaps of S is itself stable and therefore each of the conditional gaps of S lives on the
same condition. Indeed, suppose that two conditional gaps (s1, t1) and (s2, t2) live on events A and B,
respectively, and A ⊆ B with A 6= B. Then it follows that
(s1, t1) = (s1, t1)|A v (s1, t1)|A+ (s2, t2)|B ∩Ac v S@
contradicting the maximality of (s1, t1). Hence A = B.
21It is possible that s, t attain ±∞ on some positive condition.
22May live on an event A strictly smaller than Ω.
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Lemma 7.1. The conditionally complete order > restricted to any S v R living on Ω admits a condi-
tionally countable order dense subset.
Proof. Analogous to conditional gaps, we define a predecessor-successor as a maximal interval (s, t) v
S@ but under the additional requirement that s < t. In other words, these are conditionally maximal
non-trivial conditional gaps. Alike conditional gaps, predecessor-successor pairs of S form a conditional
family and therefore all live on the same condition. This condition is per definition smaller than the one
on which the conditional gaps live.
Now, up to conditioning, we may assume that the conditional gaps of S are all living on Ω.23 Since
B1/m(q) for m ∈ N and q ∈ Q is a conditionally countable base of the topology, the family of those
intersections B1/m(q) u S living on Ω is a conditionally countable family which we denote (Un). By
means of the conditional axiom of choice, see [14, Theorem 2.17], there exists a conditionally countable
family (un) such that un ∈ Un for all n. Let further A be the condition on which the conditional family
(si, ti) of the predecessors-successors of S is living. It follows that U = (un) unionsq (si) is a conditionally
countable order dense subset of S living on Ω. Indeed, let s < t for s, t ∈ S and B the condition on
which (s, t) is a predecessor-successor pair, that is, the maximal condition such that s is an element of
(si). It follows that there exists v ∈ S such that s < v < t on Bc. Hence, we may find q ∈ Q and n ∈ N
such that s < q − 1/m < v < q + 1/m < t on Bc which ensures the existence of some un in the family
(un) such that s < un < t on Bc. It follows that u = s|B + un|Bc ∈ U and s 6 u 6 t.
We are then left to show that U is conditionally countable. Since (un) is conditionally countable,
according to [14, Lemma 2.33], it is enough to show that the conditional family of open sets ]si, ti[=
]si, ti[i∈I , where (si, ti) is the conditional collection of predecessor-successors, is conditionally count-
able. Without loss of generality, suppose that this family lives on Ω. For any two ]si, ti[ and ]sj , tj [ such
that si 6= sj on any non-empty condition, it follows that ]si, ti[u]sj , tj [= R|∅. This provides a condi-
tionally pairwise disjoint family of conditionally open sets on Ω. By means of the conditional axiom of
choice, [14, Theorem 2.17], we choose a conditional family (qi) of elements of Q such that qi ∈]si, ti[
for every i. For P = unionsq{qi} v Q, define f : I → P , i 7→ qi. This function is a well-defined conditional
function. Indeed, for qi = qj , it follows that qi ∈]si, ti[u]sj , tj [. Both being conditional gaps of S, this
implies that ]si, ti[=]sj , tj [ and therefore i = j. This also shows that f is a conditional injection, thus I
is at most conditionally countable. 
Theorem 7.2 (Debreu’s Gap Lemma). For every S v R there exists a conditionally strictly increasing
function g : S → R such that all the conditional gaps (s, t) of g(S) are of the form
(s, t) = {s}|A+]s, t[|B.
This theorem says that there exists a strictly increasing transformation of S such that any conditional gap
which is of the form (7.1) is transformed in a gap which conditionally is either empty, a singleton or an
open set. The following argumentation follows the proof idea in [33].
Proof. Step 1: According to Lemma 7.1, let U = {un : n ∈ N} be a conditionally countable order
dense subset of S. We construct a conditionally increasing function f : U → [0, 1]. Let H be the set of
23On the condition where none of the gaps lives, it holds S = R for whichQ is a conditionally countable order dense subset.
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conditional functions f : V → [0, 1], where V = {uk : 1 6 k 6 n}, n ∈ N or V = U and such that24
f(u1) = 1/2,
f(uk) =
sup
l6k−1
{f(ul) : ul < uk}+ inf
l6k−1
{f(ul) : uk < ul}
2
, k > 2.
By definition, any f ∈ H is conditionally strictly increasing on its domain and H is a conditional set.
Furthermore f : {u1} → [0, 1] with f(u1) = 1/2 is an element of H so that H lives on Ω. We show that
there exists a function f ∈ H with domain U . For f : V → [0, 1] and g : W → [0, 1] in H , define f 4 g
if V v W and f = g restricted on V . Let now (fi) be a chain in H and define f : V := unionsqVi → [0, 1],
u =
∑
uj |Aj 7→ f(u) =
∑
fj(uj)|Aj where uj ∈ Vj for every j is a well-defined conditional function
in H . Indeed, H is a conditional set, the fi are restrictions of each others and Vi v Vj if fi 4 fj . By
Zorn’s Lemma, there exists a maximal function f ∈ H , f : V → [0, 1]. Next we show that V = U . For
the sake of contradiction, suppose that V = {uk : 1 6 k 6 n} for some n ∈ N on some non-trivial event
A. Without loss of generality, assume that A = Ω. Define g : {uk : 1 6 k 6 n+ 1} → [0, 1] by setting
g = f on {uk : 1 6 k 6 n} and
g(un+1) =
sup
l6n
{f(ul) : ul < un+1}+ inf
l6n
{f(ul) : un+1 < ul}
2
As for those n 6 m 6 n + 1, it follows that m = n|A + (n + 1)|Ac and we set g(um) = g(un)|A +
g(un+1)|Ac. By construction, g : {uk : 1 6 k 6 n+ 1} → [0, 1] is an element of H which coincides on
V with f . Since g is defined on V unionsq {un+1} it contradicts the maximality of f . Thus the domain of the
maximal function f ∈ H is U .
Step 2: Let U = {un : n ∈ N} and f : U → [0, 1] as defined in the previous step. Suppose that
V,W v U living on Ω satisfy
(a) V unionsqW = U ,
(b) V 6W ,25
(c) ∅ is the unique condition on which V and W have both a maximum and a minimum, respectively.
Then
sup
s∈V
f(s) = inf
t∈W
f(t).
By (b) it holds supV f(s) 6 infW f(t). In order to show the reverse inequality, according to (c), it is
sufficient to suppose that V and W have both nowhere a maximum and a minimum, respectively, since
then the gap is the largest. For the sake of contradiction, up to conditioning, suppose that
sup
V
f(s) + ε < inf
W
f(t)
for some ε > 0. Choose s0 = um ∈ V and t0 = un ∈W such that
sup
V
f(s)− ε 6 f(s0) 6 sup
V
f(s) and inf
W
f(t) 6 f(t0) 6 inf
W
f(t) + ε. (7.2)
24With the classical convention that the infimum and supremum over emptyset is equal to 1 and 0, respectively. That is, f(uk) =
infl6k−1 f(ul)/2 on the condition where uk < ul for every l 6 k − 1 and f(uk) = (supl6k−1 f(ul) + 1)/2 on the
condition where ul < uk for every k − 1 6 l.
25In the sense that for all s ∈ V and for all t ∈W it holds s 6 t.
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Since V has nowhere a maximum, there exists uk ∈ V such that um < uk < un and k > n,m. Let
k′ = min{k > n,m : un < uk < um}. By construction of f and since (a) holds, it follows that
f(uk′) =
f(un) + f(um)
2
=
f(s0) + f(t0)
2
.
Adding both inequalities in (7.2) yields
supV f(s) + infW f(t)
2
− ε
2
6 f(uk′) 6
supV f(s) + infW f(t)
2
+
ε
2
,
and therefore supV f(s) < f(uk′) < infW f(t) contradicting uk′ ∈ V .
Step 3: Define g : S → R by g(s) = supu∈U,u6s f(u). By construction, g is a conditionally strictly
increasing extension of f since U is a conditionally countable order dense subset of S. Let (s, t) be a
conditional gap of g(S) and A be the maximal event such that s < t, that is (s, t) = (s, t)|A + {s}|B.
Without loss of generality, suppose that A = Ω and B = ∅. Define V = {u ∈ U : f(u) 6 s} and
W = {u ∈ U : f(u) > t}. Since s < t and V , W satisfy (a) and (b) of the previous step, (c) has to be
violated. Hence V andW have both a conditional maximum and minimum respectively on some maximal
non-empty event C, that is, s = f(un) and t = f(um) on C for some n,m. Thus s|C, t|C ∈ g(S)|C
showing that (s, t)|C =]s, t[|C. IfC is non equal to Ω, we follow the same argumentation but conditioned
on Cc which yields a contradiction with the maximality of C. Therefore, (s, t) =]s, t[ which ends the
proof. 
Theorem 7.3. Any numerically representable conditionally upper semi-continuous preference order ad-
mits a conditionally upper semi-continuous numerical representation.
Proof. Let U˜ be a numerical representation of a conditionally upper semicontinuous preference order <.
According to Debreu’s Gap Lemma 7.2 there exists a conditional function g : Im(U˜)→ R such that all
the conditional gaps (s, t) of g(Im(U˜)) are of the following form
(s, t) = s|A+]s, t[|B, for s < t.
Since g is strictly increasing, it follows that U = g ◦ U˜ is a conditional numerical representation of <
as well. Clearly Im(U) = g(Im(U˜)). In order to verify the upper semi-continuity, pick m ∈ R. We
distinguish between the following cases:
• If m = U(y), then {x ∈ X : U(x) > m} = {x ∈ X : U(x) > U(y)} = {x ∈ X : x < y} which
is conditionally closed by assumption.
• If m ∈]s, t[ where ]s, t[ is a conditional gap of Im(U), then t = U(y) for some y ∈ X , and thus
{x ∈ X : U(x) > m} = {x ∈ X : U(x) > t} = {x ∈ X : U(x) > U(y)} = {x ∈ X : x < y}
which is also conditionally closed by assumption.
• If m = s where {s} is a conditional gap of Im(U), then let (sn) = (U(yn)) v Im(U) be a
conditional sequence such that sn ↗ s. It holds {x ∈ X : U(x) > s} = un{x ∈ X : U(x) >
sn} = un{x ∈ X : U(x) > U(yn)} = un{x ∈ X : x < yn} which is conditionally closed as the
conditional intersection of closed sets.
Since R = Im(U) unionsq [Im(U)]@ and [Im(U)]@ is made of gaps of the form (s, t) = {s}|A+]s, t[|B, it
follows that any m ∈ R belongs conditionally to one of the previous three cases. Thus U is conditionally
upper semi-continuous. 
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A. Technical Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 4.8.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4.8). Let O = (On)n∈N be a conditionally countable topological base of X
and µ be a strictly positive measure onN. We know that Z(x) := U(x)@ is conditionally open for every
x ∈ X . Fix some x ∈ X and let A be the event on which lives Z(x). Then {n ∈ N : On|A v Z(x)} is
a conditional subset ofN. Next define
U(x) = µ({n ∈ N : On|A v Z(x)})|A+ 0|Ac.
If x < y, then U(x) > U(y) since Z(y) v Z(x). Otherwise if x  y, then y ∈ Z(x). Since Z(x)
is conditionally open, there exists a neighborhood Oi0 of y such that Oi0 v Z(x). However, since y ∈
Z(y)@ uOi0 , it follows that Oi0 is nowhere a subset of Z(y). Hence, U(x) > U(y) + µ({i0}) > U(y).
By Theorem 7.3 we can choose U to be conditionally upper semi-continuous which ends the proof. 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 5.1.
We will follow the classical proof adapted to the conditional setting.
Lemma A.1. Let < be a conditionally complete preference order satisfying both the conditional inde-
pendence and Archimedean axioms. Then the following assertions hold:
(i) If x  y, then βx+ (1− β)y  αx+ (1− α)y for all 0 6 α < β 6 1.
(ii) If x  z and x < y < z, then there exists a unique α ∈ [0, 1] with y ∼ αx+ (1− α)z.
(iii) If x ∼ y, then αx+ (1− α)z ∼ αy + (1− α)z for all α ∈ [0, 1] and all z ∈M.
Proof. (i) Strictly analogous to the classical proof, see for instance [23, p. 54].
(ii) Up to conditioning, we may assume that x  y  z.26 The candidate is
α := sup{β ∈ [0, 1] : y < βx+ (1− β)z}
We obtain a partition A,B,C of Ω such that y ∼ αx + (1 − α)z on A, y  αx + (1 − α)z on B and
αx+(1−α)z  y onC. Conditioned onB andC respectively, we may apply the classical argumentation,
see for instance [23, p. 54] yielding a contradiction showing that B = C = ∅ and therefore A = Ω which
ends the proof. As for the uniqueness, this is a consequence of the first point.
(iii) Let α ∈ [0, 1] and z ∈ X . There exists a partition of A,B,C of Ω such that αx + (1 − α)z ∼
αy + (1 − α)z on A, αx + (1 − α)z  αy + (1 − α)z on B and αx + (1 − α)z  αy + (1 − α)z on
C. The same contradiction argumentation as in the classical case, [23, p. 54–55], conditioned on B and
C, respectively, shows that B = C = ∅ and therefore A = Ω. 
Proof (Theorem 5.1). Let x, y ∈ X be such that x  y and define the conditional convex subset Nx,y :=
{z ∈ X : x < z < y}. For z ∈ Nx,y , part (ii) of Lemma A.1 yields a unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that
z ∼ αx + (1 − α)y. Setting U(z) := α, z ∈ Nx,y provides a well-defined conditional function from
Nx,y to [0, 1]. Indeed, let [ai, zi] ⊆ A × Nx,y , and denote αi = U(zi) and α = U(
∑
zi|Ai). There
26On the condition where x ∼ y set α = 1 and on the condition where y ∼ z, set α = 0.
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exists a partition A,B,C of Ω such that α =
∑
αi|Ai on A, α >
∑
αi|Ai on B and
∑
αi|Ai > α on
C. In particular, α > αi on B ∩ Ai and αi > α on C ∩ Ai for every i. Hence, if either B or C were
non-empty events, this would contradict the uniqueness of some αi on B∩Ai 6= ∅ or C ∩Ai 6= ∅. Hence
B = C = ∅ showing that A = Ω. The extension to X follows exactly the same argumentation as the
classical case, see [23, p. 55]. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 6.1.
In a conditional topological space X with conditional topological dual X∗, the conditional absolute polar
of a set O v X living on Ω is given by
O• = {x∗ ∈ X∗ : |〈x∗, x〉| 6 1 for all x ∈ O}
Lemma A.2. Let X be a conditional topological vector space with conditional dual X∗ and O a condi-
tional base of neighborhoods of 0 in X . Then
X∗ =
⊔
O∈O
O•.
Proof. Let x∗ ∈ X∗, then V = [x∗]−1([−1, 1]) is a conditional neighborhood of 0. In particular, x∗ ∈
V •. Choose O ∈ O such that O v V . Then V • v O•, and thus x∗ ∈ O•. The reciprocal is immediate
since O• v X∗. 
Proposition A.3. Let X be a locally convex conditional topological vector space X which is condition-
ally separable. Relative to any conditionally σ(X∗, X)-compact subset C v X , the σ(X∗, X)-topology
is conditionally metrizable.
Proof. Without loss of generality, by the conditional version of the Banach-Alaoglu Theorem [14] and
the previous lemma, we may assume that C = O• for some conditional neighborhood O of 0 in X .
First, we construct a conditional distance on O• as follows. Let (xn) v O be a conditionally dense
sequence in O and define d : O• ×O• → R+ by
d(x∗, y∗) =
∑
n∈N
1
2n
|〈x∗ − y∗, xn〉|
1 + |〈x∗ − y∗, xn〉| , x
∗, y∗ ∈ O•. (A.1)
Straightforward inspection shows that it is a well-defined conditional function and a translation invariant
distance on O•. Indeed, as a locally convex conditional topological vector space, X separates the points
of X∗ and a fortiori those of O•. Furthermore,
{x∗ ∈ X∗ : |〈x∗, xk〉| < r, 1 6 k 6 n} v
{
x∗ ∈ X∗ : d(0, x∗) < r + 2−n+1} = Br+2−n+1(0),
for every n ∈ N and r > 0. This shows that the conditional topology generated by d on O• is weaker
than σ(X∗, X), that is, τd v σ(X∗, X).27
Second, we show that these topologies coincide. To this end, we consider the identity map Id :
(O•, σ(X∗, X)) → (O•, d) which is a bijection. Let (x∗α) v O• be a conditional net converging in
27Note that the construction of such a metric can be done similarly on X∗ by considering a conditionally dense sequence (xn) of
elements in X , and the topology induced by d on X∗ is therefore weaker that σ(X∗, X).
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σ(X∗, X) to x∗ ∈ O•. For r > 0, choose k ∈ N such that ∑n>k 2−n < r. Since x∗α, x∗ ∈ O• and
xn ∈ O, it follows that |〈x∗α − x∗, xn〉| 6 2 for every n ∈ N. Hence,
d(xα, x) 6
∑
16n6k
|〈x∗α − x∗, xn〉|+ 2r (A.2)
Since |〈x∗α − x∗, xn〉| → 0 for every n ∈ N, it follows that lim sup d(xα, x) 6 2r for every r > 0.
This shows that Id is continuous. Now, (O•, σ(X∗, X)) is conditionally compact due to the conditional
version of Banach-Alaoglu and (C, d) is conditionally Hausdorff, it follows that Id is conditionally bi-
continuous.28 Hence, V ∈ τd for every V ∈ σ(X∗, X) showing that τd = σ(X∗, X) relative to O•. 
Proof (of Proposition 6.1). Denoting by (On) the conditional countable neighborhood of 0 in X , de-
fine <n as the conditional restriction to O•n of <. Clearly, <n is conditionally σ(X∗, X)-upper semi-
continuous for every n. Furthermore, by the conditional version of Banach-Alaoglu, O•n is σ(X
∗, X)-
compact. By Proposition A.3, it follows that O•n is conditionally metrizable and compact, hence condi-
tionally second countable. Theorem 4.8 implies that <n is representable and by Theorem 4.6, it admits
a conditionally countable order dense subset Zn v O•n. By means of [14, Lemma 2.33], Z := unionsqZn
is a conditionally countable set. By means of Lemma A.2, straightforward inspection shows that Z is
<-conditionally order dense. Therefore, once again by means of Theorem 4.6, < admits a conditional
numerical representation. Theorem 7.3 guarantees that such a conditional numerical representation can
be chosen σ(X∗, X)-upper semi-continuous. 
A.4. Proof of the Automatic Continuity Result.
Proposition A.4. Let X be a conditional Fréchet lattice and Z v X be conditionally monotone and
convex. If f−1(Z) is conditionally closed in [0, 1] for every given pair x, y ∈ X , where f : [0, 1] → X ,
α 7→ αx+ (1− α)y, then Z is conditionally closed in X .
Proof. Denote by d the conditional Fréchet distance on X , and let (xn) a conditional sequence of ele-
ments in Z conditionally converging to x ∈ X . Up to a rapid conditional subsequence, we may suppose
that d(xn, x) ≤ 2−n/n, n ∈ N. It follows that
∑
k>1 k(xk − x)+ is conditionally converging. Indeed,
since the conditional Fréchet distance respects the conditional absolute value, it follows for n < m
d
 ∑
16k6n
k(xk − x)+,
∑
16k6m
k(xk − x)+
 6 d
0, ∑
n<k6m
k(xk − x)

6
∑
n<k6m
kd(x, xk) 6
∑
n<k6m
2−k −−−−−→
m,n→∞ 0 (A.3)
Hence, the conditional completeness of X implies that y = x +
∑
k>1 k(xk − x)+ is well-defined and
for each α ∈ [0, 1[ it holds
αx+ (1− α)y = x+ (1− α)
∑
k>1
k(xk − x)+ > x+ (1− α)n(xn − x)+
28Every conditionally continuous bijection f : C → D where C is a conditionally compact and D conditionally Hausdorff is
conditionally bi-continuous. Indeed, every conditionally closed set F v C is conditionally compact and since f is conditionally
continuous, it follows that f(F ) is conditionally compact, see [14, Proposition 3.35]. Moreover, since D is conditionally
Hausdorff, it holds f(F ) is conditionally closed.
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for every n ∈ N. Choosing n > 1/(1− α) yields
αx+ (1− α)y > x+ (1− α)n(xn − x)+ > x+ (xn − x)+ > xn ∈ Z
By monotonicity of Z, it holds αx + (1 − α)y ∈ Z. Since n can be chosen arbitrarily large, it follows
that [0, 1[v f−1(Z) for α 7→ x + (1 − α)y, α ∈ [0, 1]. By assumption, the latter set is conditionally
closed in [0, 1], therefore 1 ∈ f−1(Z), that is, x ∈ Z ending the proof. 
Proof (of Proposition 6.3). Fix an x0 ∈ X and denote by Z := U(x0). Then Z is conditionally convex
and monotone since < is so. We show that I := f−1(Z) is conditionally closed in [0, 1] where f :
[0, 1]→ X , α 7→ αx+ (1−α)y for any given x, y ∈ X . Up to conditioning, we may assume that I lives
on Ω – in particular I is not conditionally empty29. Since Z is conditionally convex and f conditionally
affine, it follows that I is conditionally convex. Therefore, I is an interval (s, t) v [0, 1] where s = inf I
and t = sup I . If s = t, then I is a singleton and therefore is conditionally closed. Otherwise, let
s < t without of loss of generality. Suppose now, for the sake of contradiction, s ∈ I@. That is to say,
αx+ (1− α)x0 < y  sx+ (1− s)x0 for every α ∈]s, t[. The one-sided Archimedean axiom yields a
β ∈]0, 1[ such that
y  β(αx+ (1− α)z) + (1− β)(sx+ (1− s)z) = γx+ (1− γ)z
where γ = βα+ (1−β)s. Since β > 0 and s < α, it follows that γ > s contradicting the definition of s.
Hence, sx+ (1− s)z ∈ Z, and thus s ∈ (s, t). By an analogous argumentation for t, it can be concluded
that (s, t) = [s, t]. By Proposition A.4, it holds Z is conditionally closed which ends the proof. 
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